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I. INTRODUCTION
The legal, academic, and business communities are currently focusing attention
on the intersection of intellectual property law and antitrust law. Recently, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice began hearings ("joint FTC/DOJ hearings") on the role and interaction of
* This paper is based on a speech given by Matthew Jacobs on February 16, 2002, at the Symposium on
Intellectual Property entitled: "Beyond Napster: The Future of the Digital Commons," hosted by University of the
Pacific, McGeorge School of Law in Sacramento, California.
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these two bodies of law.' In the highly publicized Napster case, Federal District
Court Judge Patel of the Northern District of California raised the question of
whether the recording industry may have violated antitrust law.2 Furthermore, the
National Academy of Sciences has formed a committee which is investigating the
economic impact of changes in patent law and administration over the past twenty-
five years.3
There is a growing view that the legal protection given to intellectual property
has increased tremendously in the past twenty years, and has begun to adversely
affect competition and innovation in the United States and across the globe.4 As the
United States economy has become increasingly based upon information and
technology, the importance of intellectual property law has likewise increased.
Accordingly, there has been a demand for greater intellectual property protection.
In addition, the development and expansion of the Internet has increased the
ability of copyists to distribute, use, and publish information which may infringe an
author's or inventor's intellectual property law rights. The Internet, and its disregard
for geographic borders, has led to new legislation-such as the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) 5-which concerns intellectual property and arguably
expands the protection for intellectual property to the detriment of competition.
Thus, many believe that the growing protection for intellectual property has
overcome the protection of competition provided by antitrust law.
6
1. See Federal Trade Commission, FTC/DOJ Hearings to Highlight the Intersection of Antitrust and
Intellectual Property Law and Policy, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa2O02/04/iplaw2.htm (last visited May 5, 2002)
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
2. See Brenda Sandburg, Napster Judge Sings an Antitrust Tune, THE RECORDER, Feb. 25, 2002,
available at http://www.law.com/cgi-bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+FrContentServer?pagename=law/View&c=Artile
&cid=ZZZR3QWTOYC&live=true&cst=1&pc=0&pa--0&s=News&Explgnore=true&showsummary--O (last visited
May 5, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
3. See FTC/DOJ Joint Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law, Testimony of Richard C.
Levin, at http://www.ftc.gov/oslcomments/intelpropertycomments/levinrichardc.htm (last visited May 5, 2002)
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
4. For example, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is intervening as amicus
curiae in a copyright case filed by Sony. The ACCC is concerned about the interpretation of anti-circumvention
provisions and the consequent effect on competition. See Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v.
Stevens [2001] FCA 1379, at http://www.austlii.edu.aulcgi-binldisp.pl/au/cases/cthlfederal%5fct/2001/1379.
html?query=%22sony%22+and+%22accc%22 (last visited May 5, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer); see also ACCCDefends the Rights ofPlaystation Owners, at http://203.6.251.7/accc.intemet/digest/view_
media.cfm?RecordlD=595 (last visited May 5, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (defending
ACCC intervention).
5. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 512,
1201-1205, 1301-1332, 4001) (1998) [hereinafter DMCA].
6. While some argue that the legal protection that is provided to intellectual property has increased greatly,
in some areas that legal protection has been curtailed or not extended. For example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recently limited the scope of the doctrine of equivalents in Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001) and
Johnson &Johnston, Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The Federal Circuit also recently
created a doctrine which operates as a defense known as "prosecution laches" in the recent decision of Symbol
Technologies, Inc., et al. v. Lemelson Medical, Education, and Research Foundation, 277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir.
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At first blush, intellectual property laws and antitrust laws appear to conflict.
Intellectual property law provides the principle legal framework for the protection
of information and technology. The basic rationale of providing intellectual property
law-copyright and patent-protection is found in the Constitution of the United
States.7 The Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power... [t]o
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." 8 Thus, a monopoly-like right is provided to the author or inventor for
a limited time in order to encourage innovation-the creation of new inventions and
works of authorship.
The antitrust laws apparently prevent monopoly-like rights.9 However, both
areas of law directly or indirectly serve a similar interest-the promotion of consumer
welfare-and thus, complement one another. Due to the fact that both sets of laws can
co-exist with one another, the question becomes where the line is drawn between
one set of laws and the other. When those two sets of laws intersect, should antitrust
law dominate or should intellectual property law dominate? These are some of the
questions that are being asked at the joint FTC/DOJ hearings.10
Specifically, one of the issues presented at thejoint FTC/DOJ hearings concerns
the role of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal
Circuit") in this controversy,i" and the Federal Circuit's recent decision in Copier
Services Unlimited, Inc. (CSU) v. Xerox Corporation,12 where the Federal Circuit
was squarely confronted with the intersection and apparent conflict of antitrust and
patent laws. 3 Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to provide an overview of
the CSU v. Xerox case, with limited comment, to address some of the many
implications of the decision. 14 However, the article will first discuss the state of
2002). Moreover, Congress has thus far declined to provide additional legal protection to electronic databases
beyond that which is already provided by copyright law. Cf. European Parliament Council, Directive 96/9/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, available at
http:lleon.law.harvard.edulh2o/property/altemativesldirective.html (last visited May 5,2002) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer).
7. See U.S. CON sT. Art. 1, §8, cl. 8.
8. Id.
9. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2 (Supp. 1992) [hereinafter Sherman Act] (condemning agreements
or conspiracies to restrict interstate and international trade or commerce).
10. See supra note I and accompanying text.
11. See Federal Trade Commission, Muris Announces Plans for Intellectual Property Hearings, Nov. 15,
2001, at http:llwww.ftc.gov/opal2001/ll iprelease.htm (last visited May 5, 2002) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer).
12. 203 F.3d 1322 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143, 148 L. Ed. 2d 954, 121 S. Ct. 1077 (2001).
13. See generally id.
14. See infra Part IH (discussing the background and analysis of the CSU v. Xerox case). This article is not
intended to provide an exhaustive analysis of the case. For further discussion of this case, see Nicolas Oettinger,
Comment, Refusal to License: In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, 16 BERKELEY TECH.
LJ. 323 (2001); see also Michelle M. Burtis & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Why an Original Can Be Better Than a Copy:
Intellectual Property, The Antitrust Refusal to Deal, and ISO Antitrust Litigation, 9 S. CT. ECON. REv. 143 (2001).
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patent law prior to creation of the Federal Circuit, and outline some of the basic
principles of patent and antitrust law.'
5
II. BACKGROUND AND PRINCIPLES OF PATENT
AND ANTITRUST LAW
A. The State of Patent Law Prior to Creation of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit in 1982,16 the circuit courts of
appeal in the United States viewed patents with skepticism.17 As discussed above,
the legal protection provided by a patent-the statutory right to exclude others from
making, using or selling an invention-apparently conflicts with the antitrust law's
antipathy toward monopolies. However, it is now well-accepted that the grant of a
patent does not automatically confer market power.'8 At least one reason for this is
because there may be an acceptable substitute for the patented product or method.' 9
In fact, in some jurisdictions, the grant of a patent is not even presumed to convey
market power.20 Thus, the possession of a patent or other intellectual property does
not equate to an impermissible monopoly or exercise of prohibited monopoly power.
Historically, the law abhors a monopoly, much like a forfeiture. Thus, when
appellate courts were presented with a patent, the appellate court saw an evil
monopoly. This misconception led to the inconsistent and misapplication of patent
law. Basically, in some circuits, patents were viewed as impermissible monopolies
and were struck down as invalid or unenforceable, while in other circuits patents
were held valid and enforceable, but often were construed very narrowly.2' The
following tale illustrates the problem:
The story is told of then-Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Thurgood
Marshall when he was visiting Senators in preparation for his confirmation
hearing as President Johnson's nominee to the Supreme Court. One well-
known Senator asked Judge Marshall what his views were on patents. The
Judge reportedly responded, "I haven't given patents much thought,
15. See infra Part II.
16. See Simone A. Rose, Patent "Monopolyphobia ":A Means of Extinguishing the Fountainhead?, 49 CAsE
W. REs. 509, 539-45 (1999) (discussing the formation of the federal circuit).
17. See id. at 535.
18. See Abbott Lab. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Rose, supra note 16, at 535.
296
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Senator, because I'm from the Second Circuit and as you know we don't
uphold patents in the Second Circuit."22
The splits in the circuits led to forum shopping and a national patent system that did
not make sense. While the system was supposed to provide a limited right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the patented invention in order to provide an
incentive to innovate, patents were sometimes not worth the paper they were written
on depending upon the circuit in which a case was filed. Thus, business executives
and their counsel were unable to make informed decisions whether to invest in
research and development to create new products or services because the value or
scope of the corresponding statutory patent right was unclear.23 To respond to this
uncertainty, the Carter Administration conceived of the idea of creating a federal
appellate court that would have exclusive jurisdiction over all patent appeals from
the United States District Courts.24 The idea was that such a court would provide
certainty to the development and application of patent law and eliminate forum
shopping?5 The hope was that this would encourage companies and individuals to
invest in research and development, and create new products and technology.
26
While the Carter Administration did not get the idea off the ground, it was picked
up by the Reagan Administration, and in 1982, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit was created. 27
Twenty years have now passed since the formation of the Federal Circuit. The
number of patents issued annually has skyrocketed from 66,000 in 1980 to 175,000
in 2000.2 Royalties from patent licenses also grew from $3 billion to nearly $110
billion between 1980 and 1999.29 Arguably, business executives and their counsel
can look to a coherent and consistent body of patent law which can guide their
research and development decisions. 30 At least in the view of some, the Federal
Circuit has been a success.3
22. Hon. Gerald Mossinghoff, The Creation of the Federal Circuit, in DONALD S. CHISUM, ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 31 (1998).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Brenda Sandburg, UndertheMicroscope, THEREcORDER, Feb. 26,2002, available at http:llpirate.
shu.edu/-jenninju/IntemetLaw/03LPatent/FTCDoJHearingsPatentsLawComFebO2.htm (last visited May 5, 2002)
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
29. See i.
30. See Mossinghoff, supra note 22, at 31.
31. See id.; see also Prepared Remarks of James E. Rogan, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual
Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Hearings on Competition and Intellectual
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Feb. 6, 2002, available at http:llwww.ftc.gov/
opp/intellect/rogan.htm (last visited May 5, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating that
"[s]everal independent developments in the last twenty years also have affected patent policy). "One was the
establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The existence of a court of national jurisdiction for
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B. Basic Principles of Patent Law
As explained previously, the principal purpose of patent law is set forth in the
United States Constitution.32 Congress exercised its power to create a patent law by
enacting the Patent Act.33 Patents provide the patent owner with the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the patented invention.34 This right to exclude
others is provided in exchange for public disclosure of the invention.35
Patent rights do not arise automatically. The inventor must apply for a patent
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). 36 The USPTO
examines the patent application to ensure that it meets certain statutory standards.
The applicant must demonstrate that the invention is novel,37 non-obvious,
38 useful, 39
and falls within allowable statutory subject matter.40 Furthermore, the applicant must
satisfy several other requirements, including the written description, enablement,
and best mode requirements, which basically ensure that the applicant has fully
disclosed her invention to the public.
Infringement of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
patented invention provides the patent holder a claim against the alleged infringer.4 2
A direct infringement action is proven either through literal infringement or
infringement by the doctrine of equivalents.43 Literal infringement occurs when
cases involving patents has been an invaluable tool. By reducing the jurisdictional conflicts that had preceded the
court's formation, the Federal Circuit has made for a more stable patent system."
32. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (quoting Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the United States
Constitution).
33. The Patent Act is codified at 35 U.S.C. §§1-376 (2002).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2002) (stating that "[elvery patent shall contain a short title of the invention and
a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States, and, if the
invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United
States, or importing into the United States, products made by that process, referring to the specification for the
particulars thereof').
35. See Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249,255 (1945).
36. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, How To Get a Patent, at http:llwww.uspto.gov/
web/patents/howtopat.htm (last visited May 5, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
37. 35 U.S.C. §102 (2002).
38. Id. §103.
39. Id. §101.
40. Id.
41. Id. §112.
42. Id. § 271.
43. See Conroy v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 14 F.3d 1570, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that the patent owner
must prove that "the accused device embodies every limitation in the claim, either literally or by a substantial
equivalent"); see also Key Mfg., Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F. 2d 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that, "[t]o
support an infringement determination, an accused device must embody exactly each claim limitation or its
equivalent").
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every limitation in the patent claim is present in the accused device." Infringement
through the doctrine of equivalents occurs when every limitation or its equivalent
in the patent claim is present in the accused device.45 The infringement action is
subject to several defenses, such as patent invalidity and unenforceability.46 The
remedy for patent infringement usually includes injunctive relief and damages.47
C. Basic Principles of Antitrust Law
The goal of antitrust law is to preserve and enhance competitive market forces .48
Its vision is that competitive markets will ensure the most efficient economy, the
lowest prices, the widest consumer choice, and the greatest consumer welfare. 49 It
therefore abhors agreements among would-be competitors not to compete.50 This
abhorrence is codified in Section 1 of the primary federal antitrust law, the Sherman
Act.5 t Antitrust law, specifically, section 2 of the Sherman Act, also despises
monopolies and monopoly power, for they are the antithesis of competitive market
forces.52
However, it is important to note the language of Section 2. It does not forbid a
"monopoly" per se, but instead bars "monopolization" and attempts to monopolize. 3
The focus is thus upon the manner in which a monopolist has obtained or attempted
to obtain its market power. As Judge Learned Hand explained in the famous case of
United States v. Aluminum Co. OfAmerica (Alcoa), "[a] single producer may be the
survivor out of a group of active companies, merely by virtue of his superior skill,
foresight, and industry .... The successful competitor, having been urged to
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins. 54 Thus, Section 2 focuses not on
the fact of monopoly alone, but rather on how a monopoly has been gained or
sustained. To engage in illegal monopolization, the defendant must possess
monopoly power, and must have used improper exclusionary acts to gain or protect
44. See Lawrence M. Sung, Ph.D., Judicial Issues: Stranger In A Strange Land: Biotechnology and the
Federal Circuit, 2 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 167, 192 (2000) (defining "literal infringement").
45. See Graver Tank& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (defining the doctrine
of equivalents").
46. See 35 U.S.C. §282.
47. See id. §281.
48. See, e.g.,James M. FesmireMaximum Vertical Price FixingfromAlbrecht Through Brunswick to Khan:
An Antitrust Odyssey, 24 SArrLE UNiv. L. R. 721,739 (2001).
49. See id.
50. See Sherman Act, supra note 9, at §1.
51. See id.
52. See id. at §2 (stating that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court").
53. See id.
54. 148 F.2d 416,430 (2d Cir. 1945).
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that power. Furthermore, treble damages may be awarded for a violation of the
antitrust laws.56
III. CSU V. XEROX
A. Background and District Court's Decision
Xerox, a manufacturer, seller, and servicer of high volume copiers, established
a policy of not selling its copier parts to independent service organizations ("ISOs"),
including CSU.57 Because this practice threatened to eliminate ISOs as competitors
in the service market for copiers, CSU filed suit against Xerox alleging that Xerox
violated the Sherman Act by setting the prices on its patented parts much higher for
ISOs than for end-users in an attempt to force ISOs to raise their prices. 8 However,
"Xerox counterclaimed for patent and copyright infringement and contested CSU's
antitrust claims as relying on injury solely caused by Xerox's lawful refusal to sell
or license patented parts and copyrighted software." 59
Procedurally, "[t]he district court granted summary judgment to Xerox
dismissing CSU's antitrust claims and holding that if a patent or copyright is
lawfully acquired, the patent or copyright holder's unilateral refusal to sell or license
its patented invention or copyrighted expression is not unlawful exclusionary
conduct under the antitrust laws, even if the refusal to deal impacts competition in
more than one market., 60 The district court further held that the right holder's intent
in refusing to deal, and any other alleged exclusionary acts committed by the right
holder, are not relevant to antitrust law.
61
B. Federal Circuit's Analysis
First, the Federal Circuit stated that the issue of whether the district court's grant
of summary judgment as to CSU's antitrust claims arising from Xerox's refusal to
55. See generally Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Grinnell
Corp. v. United States, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
56. See Sherman Act, supra note 9, at §15.
57. See Xerox, 203 F3d at 1324.
58. See id. In CSU v. Xerox, CSU, the plaintiff, asserted a cause of action for the violation of the Sherman
Act as well as misuse defenses to Xerox's infringement claims. See id. Often an antitrust cause of action is raised
as a counterclaim in a patent or copyright infringement action. Thus, the antitrust cause of action is an independent
claim. The use of antitrust law in this manner should be distinguished from the patent or copyright misuse defense.
While patent misuse and copyright misuse often involve antitrust principles, the application of the copyright or
patent misuse defense does not mean that there is a viable independent claim for an antitrust violation. In the
Napster case, District Court Judge Patel raised the issue of whether Napster can raise copyright misuse as a defense
to a copyright infringement claim. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001).
59. Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1324.
60. Id.
61. See id.
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sell its patented parts is reviewed as a matter of Federal Circuit law.62 Second, the
Federal Circuit held that Xerox's refusal to sell its patented parts did not exceed the
scope of the patent grant, and thus, the district court did not err by granting summary
judgment in Xerox's favor.63 The Court stated that "Xerox was under no obligation
to sell or license its patented parts and did not violate the antitrust laws by failing
to do so. ' 64
In reaching its second holding, the Court stated that while "[i]ntellectual
property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws... the antitrust
laws do not negate the patentee's right to exclude others from patent property.'65
The Court pointed to 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) as support for the proposition that a
patentee has the unilateral right to refuse to sell or license a patent.66 Section 271(d)
provides in part that "no patent owner otherwise entitled to relief... shall be denied
relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason
of his having... (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent .... 67
The Court noted, however, that the patentee's right to exclude is limited by two
68
exceptions. Specifically, "a patent owner who brings suit to enforce the statutory
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention is
exempt from antitrust laws, even though such a suit may have an anticompetitive
effect, unless the infringement defendant proves one of two conditions. 69 Those two
conditions are: "that the asserted patent was obtained through knowing and willful
fraud'-the so-called Walker Process claim; or "that the infringement suit was a mere
sham to cover what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere with the business
relationships of a competitor., 70 The Court stated that CSU failed to make a claim
that Xerox obtained its patents through fraud in the USPTO, and that while CSU
alleged that Xerox misused its patents, CSU failed to claim that Xerox's patent
infringement claims were shams.
71
The Court then rejected CSU' s argument that Xerox illegally sought to leverage
its presumably legitimate dominance in the equipment and parts market into
dominance in the service market.7 2 The Court stated that "we have expressly held
62. See id. at 1325 (quoting Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir.
1998) stating that "'[w]hether conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its
immunity from the antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of Federal Circuit law').
63. See id. at 1330.
64. See id. at 1328.
65. See id. at 1325.
66. See id. at 1326.
67. 35 U.S.C. §271(d) (2002).
68. Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1324.
69. See id. at 1326.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 1326-27.
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that, absent exceptional circumstances, a patent may confer the right to exclude
competition altogether in more than one antitrust market.,
73
The Court then declined to follow the Ninth Circuit case Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,74 which stated that a patent holder's desire to
exclude others from its patented invention is a presumptively valid business
justification for any immediate harm to consumers.75 The Court refused to endorse
the Eastman Kodak Co. court's apparent allowance of an evaluation of the
patentee's subjective motivation for refusing to sell or license its patented products
for pretext to overcome the presumptively valid business justification.76 Instead, the
Court followed its prior precedent which states that "if a [patent infringement] suit
is not objectively baseless, an antitrust defendant's subjective motivation is
immaterial. 77 The Court reasoned that "[w]e see no more reason to inquire into the
subjective motivation of Xerox in refusing to sell or license its patented works than
we found in evaluating the subjective motivation of a patentee in bringing suit to
enforce that right.,
78
The Court also declined to inquire into the subjective motivation of the patentee
in exerting his statutory rights unless the anticompetitive effect is illegally extended
beyond the statutory patent grant.79 The Court stated that "[iln the absence of any
indication of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham
litigation, the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust
laws." 80 Furthermore, the Court explained that the infringement defendant has the
burden of demonstrating that one of those exceptional circumstances exist and in the
absence of such proof, the Court will not inquire into the patentee's subjective
motivations for asserting his statutory right to exclude. 8' The Court added that even
if the infringement defendant has met this burden, the defendant must also prove the
elements of a Sherman Act violation.82 The Court concluded that CSU failed to meet
its burden, and that Xerox's refusal to sell its patented parts did not exceed the scope
of the patent grant.83
73. Id. at 1327.
74. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
75. See Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1327.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 1328.
82. See id.
83. See id. The Court also found that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Xerox
because CSU failed to defeat the presumption that Xerox's desire to exclude CSU from use of its copyrighted works
was a presumptively valid business justification for any resulting harm to consumers. See id. at 1327.
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IV. COMMENTS AND CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit struck the proper balance between antitrust law and patent
law in the CSU v. Xerox case. The right provided by the statutory patent grant is the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented invention. 84 The
heart of that right is the right to refuse to sell or license the patented invention to
others. The balance between the need to encourage innovation and the strength or
viability of a patent would be threatened by allowing infringement defendants or
competitors to raise the threat of antitrust treble damages and a potential inquisition
into the subjective motivation behind the patent holder's desire to refuse to deal
every time a patent holder refuses to license or sell its patented invention.
While the Federal Circuit refused to look to the subjective intent of the patentee
in refusing to deal, the Federal Circuit did state that the patentee's right to refuse to
deal is qualified by several exceptions, including the sham or baseless litigation
exception, the illegal tying exception, and the fraud on the patent office exception.85
The patentee also only may refuse to deal as long as the anticompetitive effect is not
illegally extended beyond the statutory patent grant.
86
The Federal Circuit correctly decided to apply its own circuit law to decide the
question of whether "'conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip
a patentee of its immunity from the antitrust laws."' 8 7 If the Federal Circuit did not
apply its own law, and instead applied the law of the regional circuits to decide this
question, the issue of forum shopping and the development of inconsistent law
applicable to patents would be raised again-the very problems the Federal Circuit
was created to overcome.
88
Intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws can and should coexist and work
together to increase consumer welfare. In Xerox v. CSU, the Federal Circuit struck
a balance between the two sets of laws that is sensible and workable. While antitrust
concerns were kept in focus, the Court did not lose sight of the purpose and function
of the statutory patent grant.
84. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
87. See Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1325.
88. See Burtis & Kobayashi, supra note 14, at 145.

